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Rules of the Road:
The Struggle for Safety &
the Unmet Promise of Federalism
Sara C. Bronin*
ABSTRACT: American streets have become increasingly dangerous. 2020
saw the highest roadway death rates in 96 years, and the last year for which
we have data on non-drivers, 2018, was the was the deadliest year for
pedestrians and cyclists in three decades. Though this resurgence of road
violence has many complex causes, what makes American roads uniquely
deadly are laws that lock in two interrelated design problems: unfriendly
streets and unsafe vehicles.
Design standards articulate how streets and vehicles look and function. As
they have been enshrined in law, they favor drivers and their passengers over
any other street users. Over time, they have become more centralized, and they
are heavily influenced by industry groups that structurally favor, or at least
overrepresent, car-manufacturing interests. Thus, street and vehicle design
standards are classic cases of industry capture and consequently fail to
represent non-industry parties.
But industry capture is just a symptom of an underlying problem: the
assumption that uniform national standards are preferable to state-
government involvement in vehicle design and state or local government
involvement in street design. In and of itself, centralization is not necessarily
problematic: There are compelling reasons to have national standards for
certain design features, like the shape and color of stop signs or the general
dimensions of vehicles. But other design characteristics, including width of
street lanes and strong vehicle emissions system rules, may be better or more
easily made by subnational governments. A potential benefit of subnational
regulatory authority is that innovation may influence upward, improving
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national standards. Despite the possibilities, there are legal barriers to
subnational participation. In addition to structural participatory barriers,
courts over-broadly apply preemption and sovereign immunity doctrines.
To understand these barriers, one must look beyond the capture story and
explore relevant contours of federalism. Federalism is supposed to advance
three values: representation, innovation, and liberty. These advantages are
not visible in the laws or institutional framework establishing American street
and vehicle design standards because f deralism is not allowed to do its work.
In exploring these interrelated issues, this Essay first covers the well-trod
scholarly debates about federalism, then focuses on the three values federalism
should advance. It delves deeply into the current dysfunction of street and
vehicle design standards, and argues that these standards are emblematic of
failed federalism. Finally, this Essay offers a theory for these failures: that legal
culture has calcified regulation, including overcentralized and anti-
democratic decision-making that stifles innovation that could save lives.
The Essay concludes that legal culture must change to recalibrate the balance
of regulatory authority in street and design standards. It is not enough to
simply find new ways to reduce industry capture of national standards,
though this should be done. We must also empower state and local
governments to innovate toward better substantive outcomes. Ultimately, this
Essay adds to federalism discourse by evaluating how it works in two
important, interrelated regulatory spheres and promoting inclusive,
innovative decision-making that protects vulnerable people and improves the
public realm for all.
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I. INTRODUCTION
American streets have become increasingly dangerous. 2020 saw the
highest roadway death rates in 96 years,' and the last year for which we have
data on non-drivers, 2018, was the deadliest year for pedestrians and cyclists
in three decades.2 This resurgence of road violence has many complex causes.
We might blame ever-rising speed limits, unevenly enforced traffic laws, low
gas prices, and increased driver distraction.3 We might shrug our shoulders
and call road violence a natural consequence of our collective desire for speed
and convenience. But these explanations overlook something important:
Other, similarly-developed countries are experiencing the same economic
and behavioral trends. In other countries, people love cars, too. And yet
comparable fatality rates for non-drivers4 over the last 30 years, even in car-
crazy Germany, are a small fraction of American fatalities.2
What explains the gap? Are Europeans simply more careful walkers,
better-equipped bikers, or safer drivers? Certainly not. What is different are
the rules of the road. Simply put, American laws lock in two interrelated
design problems: unfriendly streets6 and unsafe vehicles. Bad street design
1. Motor Vehicle Deaths in 2020 Estimated to be Highest in 13 Years, Despite Dramatic Drops in
Miles Driven, NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.nsc.org/newsroom/motor-
vehicle-deaths-2o2o-estimated-to-be-highest [h tps://perma.cc/C36A-8SFJ]
2. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIc SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., 20 18 FATAL MOTOR
VEHICLE CRASIHES: OVERVIEW 3 (2019), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/View
Publication/812826 [https://perma.cc/UWW9-5YN8]; see also RICHARD RETTING, GOVERNORS
HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS'N, PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC FATALITIES BY STATE: 2019 PRELIMINARY DATA 3-5
(Joe Feese, Russ Martin & Kara Macek eds., 2020), https://www.ghsa.org/sites/default/files/
2020-02/GHSA-Pedestrian-Spotlight-FINAL-rev2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC6V-7WNJ] (noting
that pedestrian fatalities increased by 53 percent between 2009 and 2018 and SUV-related
pedestrian fatalities increased by 81 percent; all other traffic deaths increased by just two
percent).
3. Note that the lack of a critical mass of walkers and bikers contributes to poor safety
conditions, perpetuating a vicious cycle. See P.L. Jacobsen, Safety in Numbers: More Walkers and
Bicyclists, Safer Walking and Bicycling, 9 INJ. PREvENTION 205, 208 (2003) (concluding that
accidents involving cyclists or pedestrians are less likely when more people are walking and
cycling).
4. Throughout this Essay, I use the term "non-driver" to mean people who are not in
vehicles. "Driver" encompasses both the person driving and the passenger being driven.
5. See Ralph Buehler & John Pucher, The Growing Gap in Pedestrian and Cyclist Fatality Rates
Between the United States and the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, 1990-2018,
41 TRANSP. REVS. 48, 50-52 (2021).
6. This Essay identifies places where conflicts between cars and non-drivers are likely, so it
focuses on "streets," defined as roads with buildings on both sides.
IOWA LAW REVIEW
would not be so deadly if vehicle design standards were better, and vice versa.
Yet both sets of standards have evolved, in tandem, to favor drivers and their
passengers over any other street users.7
Street design, centralized through national, nongovernmental standards
developed in closed-to-the-public processes, tends to prioritize vehicle
movement. These standards dictate generously wide lanes that facilitate fast
driving. They allow inadequate widths or locations for sidewalks and bike
lanes, where such amenities exist at all, making walking and biking unsafe.
And they call for signals that smooth and speed car travel, threatening people
in small cars and non-drivers.Judicial decisions on preemption and sovereign
immunity have deterred sub-national innovation to these car-centric
standards.
Vehicle design guidelines, also mostly centralized, also fail to protect
non-drivers. As larger cars flood the market, regulators fail to reign in weight
and height, despite studies showing heavier cars protect occupants but hurt
non-occupants during a crash,8 and that taller cars make it more likely a non-
driver will end up under the car, dead, instead of on the dashboard, injured.9
Similarly, regulators have not yet dealt with equipment such as "bull bars"
attached to the vehicle's front, which strike non-drivers in the more deadly
chest area, rather than the legs. Beyond the direct impact of crashes are the
indirect impacts of greenhouse gas emissions. Transportation generates the
largest share of greenhouse gases-28.2 percent-of any sector tracked by the
EPA."- Because of weak emissions standards, drivers spew toxic fumes into the
air, sickening and killing other people and themselves. The devastation is
inequitably wrought. The same groups most vulnerable to death by vehicular
7. For the last century, the automobile industry has lobbied relentlessly for this outcome.
See generally, e.g., PETER D. NORTON, FIGHTING TRAFFIC: TIlE DAWN OF THE MOTOR AGE IN TIlIE
AMERICAN CIT (explaining how the automobile industry legitimized its universal claim to the
streets).
8. Wen Hu & Jessica B. Cicchino, An Examination of the Increases in Pedestrian Motor-Vehicle
Crash Fatalities During 2009-2016, 67 J. SAFETY RsCII. 37, 41-43 (2018); Michael L. Anderson &
Maximilian Auffhammer, Pounds that Kill: The External Costs of Vehicle Weight, 81 REv. ECON. STUD.
535, 536 (2014); Michelle J. White, The "Arms Race" on American Roads: The Effect of Sport Utility
Vehicles and Pickup Trucks on Traffic Safety, 4 7 J.L. & ECON. 333, 333-34 (2004).
9. SeeJINGWEN HU & KATHLEEN D. KLINICII, UNIV. OF MICH. TRANSP. RsCII. INST., TOWARD
DESIGNING PEDESTRIAN-FRIENDLY VEIHICLES 13 (2012), https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bit
stream/handle/2027.42/92202/102873.pdf?sequence=i&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/KW4Z
-ZD4 D]; Laurie F. Beck, Ann M. Dellinger & Mary E. O'Neil, Motor Vehicle Crash Injury Rates by
Mode of Travel, United States: Using Exposure-Based Methods to Quantify Differences, 166 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 212, 215 (2007) (explaining that pedestrians are 1.5 times more likely than
passenger vehicle occupants to be killed).
10. Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/
ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/S4PK-L44A] (last updated
Dec. 4, 2020) (showing that the production of electricity produces 26.9 percent of greenhouse
gas emissions, industry 22 percent, commercial and residential buildings 12.3 percent,
agriculture 9.9 percent, and land use and forestry 11.6 percent).
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impact-the elderly, people of color, the poor, and people living in urban
areas -suffer most from the effects of vehicular pollution.' 2
Street and vehicle design standards have become more centralized, and
they are heavily influenced by industry groups that structurally favor, or at
least overrepresent, car-manufacturing interests. In that sense, these
standards are a classic case of industry capture and fail to adequately represent
non-industry parties.
Assuming, as I do, that law and legal culture play a definitive role in
ensuring inequitable but avoidable outcomes, one potential remedy might be
to direct reforms exclusively toward loosening the grip of industry on national
standards-making processes. While this should surely happen, industry
capture is just a symptom of an underlying problem: that laws and legal
culture assume that uniform, national standards are preferable to state-
government involvement in vehicle design and state or local government
involvement in street design. In and of itself, centralization is not entirely
problematic. For certain design features, like the shape and color of stop signs
or the general dimensions of vehicles, national standards make sense. But
other design characteristics, such as width of street lanes and strong vehicle
emissions system rules, may be better or more easily made by subnational
governments. A potential benefit of subnational regulatory authority is that
innovation may influence upward, improving national standards.
Full devolution, however, is not the complete solution-not only because
national standards work best in some cases, but also because devolution may
not yield a radically different political economy than the one that exists today.
Governments have many different reasons to adopt off-the-shelf design
standards, rather than create their own: inertia inherent in any governmental
bureaucracy; high start-up costs that make it expensive and time-consuming
to create independent standards; network externalities that tilt decision-
makers toward facilitating compatibility; maybe even lack of imagination.
Between full centralization and full decentralization is overlapping,
complementary, or competing authority among multiple levels of
government-something made possible by the very structure of our
i 1. See generally ANGIE SCIIMITT, RIGHT OF WAY: RACE, CLASS, AND TI IE SILENT EPIDEMIC OF
PEDESTRIAN DEATHS IN AMERICA (2020) (highlighting communities impacted by the pedestrian
safety crisis); HEATHER ZACCARO, SMART GROwTI AM., DANGEROUS BY DESIGN 17 (2019),
https://smartgrowthamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/oI /Dangerous-by-Design-2o19-
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGW7-CJWY] (noting that people age 50 and over-and those
identifying as Black/African American, American Indian, or Alaska Native-were overrepresented
in 2008-2017 pedestrian fatalities).
12. Maria Cecilia Pinto de Moura & David Reichmuth, Inequitable Exposure to Air Pollution
from Vehides in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, June 2019, at 1, 1-2;
Disparities in the Impact of Air Pollution, AM. LUNG AsS'N (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.lung.org/
clean-air/outdoors/who-is-at-risk/disparities [https://perma.cc/7D37 -LRPN] (citing numerous
studies and explaining that racism, class bias, and housing market dynamics make these
communities more susceptible).
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government. Scholarship about federalism's virtues abounds. Theories
suggest there is something to be gained by the tension between multi-party
governmental actors. Federalism should bring government closer to the
people, expanding opportunities for representation. It should foster
innovation, with races to the top among state and local policymakers. And it
should protect individual liberty, including freedom from harm. These
advantages are absent from the laws or institutional framework establishing
street and vehicle design standards, because federalism is not allowed to do
its work. Instead, Congress, federal agencies, and the courts inhibit state and
local governments participation in regulating aspects of street and vehicle
design well-suited to their involvement.
In exploring these interrelated issues, this Essay first covers the well-trod
scholarly debates about federalism, then focuses on three values federalism
could advance: representation, innovation, and liberty. Part II suggests
evaluating the success of any given regulatory framework by assessing whether
and to what extent the framework promotes these values. Part III delves
deeply into the current dysfunction of street and vehicle design standards,
detailing how they are adopted, modified, and interpreted. With that context,
Part IV argues street and vehicle standards are emblematic of failed
federalism. It offers a theory for these failures, namely that legal culture has
calcified regulation, overcentralizing and anti-democratic decision-making
that stifles innovation that could save lives. With this theory, I revive the legal
culture definition ofJerry Mashaw and David Harfst: the "inertial force" that
constrains people who manage and implement regulatory regimes.13 Their
critique of federal passenger safety standards has only become more true, and
more broadly applicable, since they wrote in 1990. Encompassing formal laws,
judicial decisions, politics, psychology, and popular thinking, legal culture
helps to explain how today's street and vehicle standards defy reason and
erode road safety.
Part V concludes that the balance of regulatory authority in street and
design standards must be recalibrated. At a minimum, drafting authority
cannot belong to unaccountable trade associations alone; non-drivers must
have a larger role. However, reducing industry capture of national standards
is not enough. State and local governments should be empowered to innovate
toward better substantive outcomes. Laws should disfavor preemption and
protect experimentation. Finally, the regulatory process should maximize the
ability of all people to be free from harm.
This Essay adds to federalism discourse by evaluating how it works in two
important, interrelated regulatory spheres. In addition, it seeks to promote
13. JERRY L. MASH Aw & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY g (1 ggo). In their
view, "legal convention[s] exert[] continuous and surprisingly sharp pressures on regulatory
structures and regulatory behavior[s]," hindering adaptation. Id.
2158 [Vol. l o6:2153
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inclusive, innovative decision-making that protects vulnerable people and
improves the public realm for all.
II. FEDERALISM IN THEORY
To understand what is missing from the federalism discourse, we must
understand what it includes. This Part first briefly considers how legal scholars
explain the relationship between local, state, and federal governments. Then
it identifies three values potentially advanced by federalism as a measure for
a regulatory framework's success. In touching upon legal scholarship, political
representation theory, judicial decisions, and institutional design questions,
this Part prefaces Part IV's more expansive discussion of legal culture.
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW
American government has a federalist structure: simultaneous separation
of powers among and mutual dependence upon different levels of
government. The Constitution establishes this structure, delegating to
Congress, among other things, the power to regulate interstate commerce
and declare war., The Tenth Amendment reserves remaining powers to the
states,' while the Supremacy Clause clarifies that in cases where Congress has
lawfully acted to preempt state law, states must recognize federal law as
supreme.b State and local governments, meanwhile, have their own
relationships with each other, variously established by state constitutions, state
charters, and judicial decisions.'7 Some situations, including "home rule"
jurisdictions, empower local governments; other situations see the state
dominating local governments. There are also distinct relationships between
local governments and the federal government.8
Considering this framework, scholars disagree about the nature of the
relationships between federal, state, and local governments, and mostly
discuss the federal-state relationship. Most modern scholars reject as archaic
a strict concept of dual federalism in which the state and federal governments
have clear, mutually exclusive powers or serve as equal sovereigns.,9 Today,
14. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
I 5. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
16. U.S. CONST. art.VI, cl. 2.
1 7. SeeJoshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff, Preempting Politics: State Power and Local Democracy,
72 STAN. L. REv. 1361, 1363-64 (2020); Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96
TEX. L. REv. 1 163, 1 165 (2018); Richard Briffault, The Challenge ofthe New Preemption, 70 STAN. L.
REv. I995, 2002-04 (2018); Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local
Relationship?, io 6 GEO. L.J. 1469, 1474-77 (2018).
18. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REv. 959, 964-66 (2007); RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 82-89 (2016).
19. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Poli/ical Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICi. L. REv. 813, 815 (1998) (asserting
"[i]t is commonplace to observe that 'dual federalism' is dead" but criticizing courts' sovereignty
202 1 ] 2159
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the prevailing view draws from sovereignty to hold that states have autonomy,
which entitles them to choose at least some of their regulatory scope. To
protect this autonomy, some scholars believe that states must challenge
certain manifestations of federal power through the courts, others that states
must decline to administer federal programs.20 Others believe American
government exemplifies cooperative federalism, in which states' primary role
is to support and carry out federal programs or act within federally-granted
authority." In their view, different levels of government have integrated
functions, and there is a normative position against dissent or friction.
Scholars like Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken, who write about
"uncooperative" federalism, are somewhere in the middle. They recognize
that while states generally cooperate, sometimes they can and should use
powers granted by the Constitution or "the federal government to tweak,
challenge, and even dissent from federal law."22 Parallel conversations exist
among scholars studying the relationships between state and local
governments.2 3
B. EVALUATING FEDERALISM
Even across these views, scholars who see value in federalism4 essentially
agree on its promise: to balance state and local interests with federal
government power, and to ensure the federal government remains accountable
to the needs of the various states, municipalities, and individuals residing
therein. To evaluate whether a particular regulatory framework has achieved
rationales in key cases); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REv. 317, 331 (1997)
("The dam of dual sovereignty collapsed in the famous case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens .... ").
See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950) (discussing
the end of dual federalism). At the same time, the historical underpinnings of a nineteenth-
century dual-sovereignty justification for our federalist system itself are undeniable. See generally
Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128YALE L.J. 1792 (2019) (discussing
the historical underpinnings of dual federalism).
20. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 19, at 816-17 (offering a functional theory of cooperative
federalism to define the limits of federal power, including states' ability to reject federal
confiscation or conscription); Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula
for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1570-71 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L .J. 1344,
1344 (1983); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the
Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692, 1726-33 (2001); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 671 (2001).
22. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256,
1259 (2oog). They consider "licensed dissent, dissent made possible by a regulatory gap, and civil
disobedience." Id. at 1272.
23. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of
Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2556-64 (2006); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control,
9 7 Mc1. L. REv. 1201, 1216-25 (1999).
24. A few scholars have argued against federalism's value. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin
& Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 909 (1994).
[Vol. 1o6:2153216o
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this promise, I propose focusing on three specific values federalism may
advance:25 representation, innovation, and liberty. All three are consistent
with each strand of federalism theory described above, though some are more
clearly aligned with particular perspectives.26 Scholars have also identified
other advantages of federalism,27 most of which can be considered a part of,
or related to, the three I feature.2S A few words about each value will preview
how Part IV will evaluate street and vehicle design standards.
1. Representation
In enabling state and local decision-making, federalism in theory enables
decision-makers to be more responsive to and accessible by their constituents
than, say, members of Congress.29 While political representation theory, with
all of its nuance, is too hefty to tackle here, let us loosely reference Hanna
Pitkin's influential approach, which argues that political representation
25. Cf Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?"'Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1348 n.16i (1994) (criticizing Akhil Reed Amar's "best
argumentforfederalism" by saying federalism "just is" and "does not need an argument" (emphasis
added) (citing Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 483,
498 (1991))).
26. For example, innovation aligns with arguments for uncooperative federalism, which
seeks to fortify state challenges to federal law in part on the basis of states' regulatory creativity;
liberty aligns well with arguments for dual federalism, which centralizes state sovereignty derived
from the will of people.
27. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 76-106 (1995) (chronicling the
virtues of federalism); Friedman, supra note ng, at 389-405 (listing public participation;
accountability; experimentation by states; citizens' health, safety, and welfare; cultural and local
diversity; and liberty); Vincent Ostrom, Can Federalism Make a Di/ference?, 3 PUBLIUS 197, 229-30
(1973) (listing ten advantages of federalism, among them citizen voice, accessibility,
administrative efficiency, and greater enforcement of constitutional law).
28. Perhaps the key exception is efficiency, and the theory that smaller jurisdictions offer
more choices to people, who are mobile, and optimize the provision of public goods as these
jurisdictions compete. See Alan P. Hamlin, Decentralization, Competition and the Efficiency of
Federalism, 67 ECON. REC. 193, 194 (1991); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,
64J. POL. ECON. 416, 418-24 (1956). Elevating efficiency as a primary evaluative principle may
be morally and methodologically problematic, not least because of its assumptions about
mobility. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303,
307 (2005) (critiquing law and economics as "a 'cult' ... done in by the twin stabbings of
excessive inaccuracy and trivial accuracy"); Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market
Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 431, 431-32
(1996) (observing critiques on moral grounds in "environmental ethics, civic republicanism, and
commodification"); Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Lam and Economics Movement:
Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 231, 2 34-37
(1991). Moreover, an efficiency frame directly opposes the goal the Framers had in mind when
they set up what is inherently an inefficient system. All this said, I discuss the tie between efficiency
and liberty infra Section II.B. 3 .
29. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 222 (2000) (showing how Congress is ill-equipped to represent diverse
individual or state-government preferences).
2021 ] 2161
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requires substantive action wherein the views of the represented are
understood, respected, and acted upon by the representatives.30
True representation thus requires a regulatory scheme that provides a
formal mechanism for, and substantively incorporate, citizen voices and
perspectives. This mechanism can come in many forms, including comment,
hearings, intervenor status, or even lobbying. Whatever the channel of
communication, the views of a diverse array of stakeholders must be heard,
without threat of capture by a limited number of interest groups.31
Decisionmakers must have the power or tools needed to react to stakeholders'
views. And there must be some accountability by decision-makers, even if they
are unelected. Thus, representation, as we evaluate it, must mean more than
simply listening.
2. Innovation
Again, in theory, federalism can result in innovation as all levels of
government experiment with different approaches, teaching and learning
from each other.32 Justice Brandeis's oft-cited notion that a state may be a
"laboratory" of democracy is particularly relevant to the view that
intergovernmental exchange produces better substantive outcomes (say, a
cleaner environment).33 Discussions about "dynamic" (or "iterative" or
"adaptive") federalism, as this back-and-forth has been called, have been
particularly active among environmental law scholars.34
To achieve innovation, however, institutions must be designed to enable
it. In particular, Congress must be clear about whether it intends to preempt
a particular field of regulation and, in the instances where it gives states
express authority to innovate, must ensure that agencies and courts cannot
thwart innovation. Simultaneously, state l gislative and judicial branches must
ensure that governments are protected from unreasonable constraints on
innovation, such as those stemming from preemption and sovereign
immunity decisions. Beyond institutional design, innovation is a product of
30. HANNA FENICIIEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209-40 (1967). She
maintains that "we need to retain the ideal of the substance of representation in addition to our
institutionalization of it." Id. at 239.
31. See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REv.
773, 778 (2013) (suggesting high levels of involvement by stakeholders, without threat of capture
by utilities or private companies).
32. In arguing against citing innovation as a potential advantage of federalism, Akhil Amar
has warned against confusing federalism with decentralization. Amar, supra note 25, at 498.
33. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory ... .").
34. See Erin Ryan, Response to Heather Gerken's Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a
Detente?, 59 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1147, 115o n.8 (2015) (listing numerous works by environmental
scholars dealing with dynamic federalism issues).
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many aspects of legal culture, notjust the laws as written and interpreted, but
also the people implementing it and the general public supporting it.
3. Liberty
Evaluating whether a particular regulatory scheme advances individual
liberty may be tricky. One could argue that federalism's very structure protects
liberty by institutionalizing intergovernmental tension that may on the whole
lead to less regulation, and thus fewer infringements on individual action. If
that is true, then perhaps the Framers' intent is fulfilled, even if it produces
sub-optimal results. But the amount of regulation cannot end the analysis. Less
regulation does not necessarily mean more freedom. In fact, the right
regulation, done at the right level, might protect liberty better than no
regulation at all.
Accordingly, when evaluating whether a given regulatory scheme
promotes liberty, substantive outcomes are what matters. One measure is
whether federalism protects individuals from abusive governments, oppression,
and known or knowable harms.35 As Akhil Amar has pointed out, in many
spheres, regulatory schemes have infringed upon individual rights to things
like desegregated schools, freedom from police brutality, and other
unconstitutional conduct.36 The role of federalism is then to give each
government, state and federal, the power and incentive to check any such
improper conduct by the other.37 In many cases, minority groups bear much
of the harm resulting from government conduct or inaction. When federalism
allows discriminatory outcomes, it fails to live up to its promise.
A second measure, equally important, is whether federalism as manifest
in the regulatory scheme in question constrains or liberates choice. In theory,
when subnational governments regulate differently from each other, they
offer people choices, including the right to exit a jurisdiction that no longer
suits their preferences.38 People may "vote with their feet," which creates
public-good efficiencies often lauded by political economists. The freedom to
exit is potentially ensured by federalism. If it is not present, there may be
something wrong.
35. See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard offudicial Review,
51 DUKE L.J. 75, 136-39 (2001) (describing how federalism can, among other things, offer a
protective buffer against a tyrannical central government).
36. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1428 (1987)
(arguing that competition "can protect popular sovereignty and spur a race to the high ground
of constitutional remedies").
37. Id. at 1427, 1492-93 (describing federalism as "a dual-agency governance structure in
which each set of government agents would have incentives to monitor and enforce the other's
compliance with the corporate charter established by the People of America").
38. Baker & Young, supra note 35, at 139.
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II. THE DESIGN STANDARDS
A foundational understanding of how street and vehicle design evolved
is necessary to critique design standards. As this Part shows, their evolution is
consistent with Mashaw and Harfst's "inertial" characterization 30 years ago;
the standards have mostly endured. But there is a caveat, because another
force is at work: a centripetal force toward centralization, affecting regulatory
schemes in the United States and elsewhere.39
Indeed, where street and vehicle design standards have modestly evolved,
this centripetal force draws them closer toward homogeneity. In the case of
streets, uniform standards first emerged over a century ago from an industry
group established to lobby for more highway funding. Street design standards
promulgated by this national group and others have been adopted at the
federal, state, and local levels, creating an astonishing amount of uniformity.
In the case of vehicles, uniform federal regulation is well-established, and may
even be appropriate for a product that regularly travels state lines. But new
issues include federal agency resistance to complementary state regulation
and an increasingly technocratic approach that undermines the safety
consumers demanded when vehicle standards were created in the first place.
A. STRFET STANDARDS
The federal government, state governments, and nearly every general-
purpose local government in the United States all own or are responsible for
roads. There are 4,165,348 linear miles of roads in the United States: 163,935
linear miles of federal roads and 781,613 of state roads, with the remaining
77 percent of roads belonging to county, municipal, and other non-state, non-
federal jurisdictions.40 Of these, this Essay's focus is streets, where tensions
between a range of users, including drivers, walkers, and bikers, are likely to
exist.4'
Street design is dictated by three primary sets of standards: geometric,
fire code, and speed and traffic standards. Geometric standards govern the
spatial relationship between curbs, driving surfaces, and walking surfaces. Fire
codes govern building construction, but they can also be used to guide the
design of roads, particularly in new subdivisions. And speed and traffic
standards govern the operation of vehicles and establish uniform signals to
39. Friedman, supra note 19, at 365-75.
40. Highway Statistics 2017, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.: FED. HIGI WAY ADMIN. (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2o17/hmio.cfm [https://perma.cc/
QVY3 -QCNM] (including roads in D.C. but excluding roads in Puerto Rico and other territories).
41. Excluded from this Essay's discussion are unpaved rural roads, which account for 31.3
percent of roads (more than federal and state roads combined). Highway Statistics 2017, supra
note 40 (showing 1,304,067 miles of unpaved rural roads). Also outside this Essay's scope is the
design of interstates, freeways, and expressways, because these are primarily used by drivers, not
by pedestrians and bicyclists who are most impacted by bad road design. See RETTING, supra note
2, at 16 fig.7 (noting 16 percent of pedestrian fatalities occurred on freeways).
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guide drivers. Each of these standards is written or influenced by a national,
nongovernmental membership association, with little public input.
When it comes to geometric standards, almost every jurisdiction with
authority over street design-including the federal government and every
state department of transportation42-have adopted the "Green Book": the
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials'
("AASHTO") A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets. AASHTO was
founded in i914, primarily to lobby for more highway funding. Thus, it comes
as no surprise that the Green Book's chief focus is to move cars quickly and
efficiently. The key indicator of a successful street is its vehicular "level of
service"-that is, the rate at which cars travel without being forced to queue
at lights or to slow their speeds. With this goal in mind, the Green Book offers
guidance on lane width, road width, stopping sight distance, driveway design,
medians, and intersections, among other things.43
In general, the applicable standards vary depending on a street's
"functional classification." Functional classifications range from fastest and
highest-volume to slowest and lowest-volume as follows: interstates, other
freeways and expressways, principal arterials, minor arterials, major and
minor collectors, and local roads.4 As use or configuration of a road changes,
its functional classification, and thus the geometric standards governing it,
may change.
Fire codes, another important type of law shaping street design, are as
uniformly adopted as the geometric standards. Forty-two states have adopted
the fire code written by International Code Council ("ICC"), and called the
International Fire Code.45 Like AASHTO, the ICC is a membership body of
experts, including state, county, and municipal code enforcement and fire
officials, engineers, architects, and others in the construction industry.46 The
International Fire Code, like AASHTO standards, is usually incorporated
42. The federal government requires that the states develop their own guidance by
combining the Green Book, "community values," an analysis on "impacts on important natural
and human resources," and other factors. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
FLEXIBILITY IN HIGHWAY DESIGN, at v-vi, https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/publications/
flexibility/flexibility.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y24 -74 PY].
43. See generally AM. ASS'N OF STATE HIGHWAY & TRANSP. OFFS., A POLICY ON GEOMETRIC
DESIGN OF HIGHWAYS AND STREETS 7TH EDITION: SUMMARY OF KEY REVISIONS AND UPDATES
(2018), https://downloads.transportation.org/publications/GDHS-7_SummaryOfChanges.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZQJ-YB4R] (identifying key changes in the guidance offered regarding the
design elements listed above).
44. Highway Functional Classification Concepts, Criteria and Procedures, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.:
FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/processes/statewide/related/
highway_functionalclassifications/sectiono3.cfm [https://perma.cc/YSW4-5 NT 5 ] (last updated
June 28, 2017).
45. International Fire Code Adoption Map, INT'L CODE COUNCIL, https://www.iccsafe.org/
content/code-adoption-maps/#ca-ifc [https://perma.cc/95Z2-J265].




wholesale in a state or local jurisdiction by reference into law. It generally
requires roads likely to be traveled by fire trucks to have 20 feet of
unobstructed path, excluding parking.47 While there is some discretion for
code officials to evaluate and approve alternative approaches to these
requirements, alternatives are not very common. The International Fire Code
does not create standards that indicate how to build narrow residential
streets.48 The result is roads wider than necessary for ordinary vehicular travel,
resulting in higher travel speeds, more pavement (and thus more stormwater
runoff), and lengthier times for pedestrian crossings.
Speed and traffic standards in many jurisdictions incorporate the Manual
of Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("MUTCD"), which specifies speed limits,
traffic signalization, road surface markings, and traffic signage standards.49
The MUTCD is published by the Federal Highway Administration but heavily
influenced by an independent organization, the National Committee on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices ("NCUTCD"). NCUTCD not only advises
the Administration on MUTCD revisions, but also interprets the MUTCD for
state and local governments. Of particular interest is the way that the MUTCD
allows for speed limits to be established. The MUTCD allows for ajurisdiction
to increase the speed limit to "the eighty-fifth percentile speed of free-flowing
traffic."5o In other words, driver speeding can and does justify raising the
speed limit, even if it is not the safest level. The Federal Highway
Administration has admitted that this method may be outdated and that it
may have the consequence of increasing speed limits over time but has not
changed the standard., High speed limits raise the risk of car crashes,
affecting both safety and the cost of driving. And the problem is worse for
pedestrians, whose lives are at risk due to high speed limits without any
potential benefit.
47. 2015 INT'L FIRE CODE § 503.2.1 (INT'L CODE COUNCIL, FOURTH PRINTING,JAN. 2016).
48. Jeffrey D. Johnson, Defining an Oregon Standard Definition for Skinny Streets 15-16
(Jan. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), https://nacto.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/
oregon-skinny-streets-johnson.pdf [https://perma.cc/XHM7-Q8GXI.
49. See 23 U.S.C. § iog(d) (2018); 23 C.F.R. § 655.603(a) (2020).
50. Gregory H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving?, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 498, 514-15 (2020)
(quoting NAT'L TRANSP. SAFE'Y BD., NTSB/SS-17/01 PB 2017-102341, SAFETY STUDY: REDUCING
SPEEDING-RELATED CRASHES INVOLVING PASSENGER VEI11CLES, at x (2017)).
51. Id. at 516.
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Though this Section has not delved into all laws affecting street design52
or what's missing from current street design rules,5s this general overview
points to several clear takeaways. First, most aspects of street design are
established by or heavily influenced by nongovernmental bodies that are not
directly accountable to the public. Second, design standards prioritize driver
convenience over non-driver safety. And finally, standards are written by
national bodies, and the vast majority of state and local governments adopt
them wholesale. What we have not yet answered is why, if state and local
governments may adopt another standard, they do not.
B. VEIICLE STANDARDS
Vehicle standards first emerged at the federal level after the creation of
the interstate highway system resulted in rising driving-related deaths.
Consumers, led by Ralph Nader, demanded regulation that would make
vehicles safer for passengers. They succeeded, but only initially. As politics
shifted and industry became better organized, legal culture changed, and
federal rules weakened.54
The federal government still provides baseline rules for most of the
design of vehicles, including their body and their emissions systems. State
governments regulate post-purchase accessories and have produced more
robust and more protective emissions systems standards. Regulations at both
levels have evolved as decisionmakers selectively address vehicle performance,
consumer cost, and environmental impact. In many respects, this looks like
cooperative federalism. But there is more to federalism than formal structure.
Currently, the federal government and nearly two dozen state governments
are litigating whether states may require stricter emissions systems than the
federal government mandates. This fight embodies uncooperative
federalism.55 What's more, it aims to write states out of the regulatory
framework entirely, which is unfortunate given how states improve federal
standards.
52. Other laws affecting street design include state laws imposing additional barriers to safe
streets. See CAL. STs. & HIGH. CODE § 1805 (West 2019) (requiring streets to have a full 40 feet
of right of way absent a four-fifths vote of its governing body). There are also local movements
proposing alternatives to federal and state standards. See Member Cities, NAT'L ASS'N OF CITY
TRANSP. OFFS., https://nacto.org/member-cities [https://perma.cc/2726-HWWK] (describing
7 1-city movement o promote designs encompassing a mix of transportation types); Complete Streets
Policies Naoi wwid, SMART GRoWri AM., https://smartgrowthamefca.org/program/national-
complete-streets-coalition/publications/policy-development/policy-atlas [https://perma.cc/
49PF-EXHB] (chronicling "Complete Streets policies" in about i,6oo local governments and 35
states).
53. See generally Michael Mattioli, Autonomy in the Age of Autonomous Vehicles, 24 B.U.J. ScI.
& TECH. L. 277 (2018) (advocating for autonomous-vehicle-focused standards).
54. MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 13, at 11-12 (noting an evolution to focus almost
exclusively on recalls).
55. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 22, at s 263.
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1. Body Design
The federal government dominates regulation of vehicular body design.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") of the
Department of Transportation has established several sets of standards. The
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards ("FMVSS") applies to most key parts
of new vehicles, including brake systems, tires, seat belts, and child safety
seats.56 In addition to the FMVSS, the NHTSA has separate regulations on
bumper standards for passenger cars, excluding sport utility vehicles ("SUVs")
and pickup trucks.57 These standards limit the damage done to front and back
bumpers in low speed collisions, and decrease the associated costs.58 Unlike
the FMVSS, which focus on passenger safety, the bumper regulations
prioritize economic concerns.59 Significant scholarly works question the
effectiveness of these federal agencies, and points to industry capture of the
rule-making process.- This debate aside, the impact of these federal
mandates is undeniable. Federal safety measures are estimated to have saved
over 6oo,ooo passenger lives between 1960 and 2012, reducing the risk of
fatality by 56 percent.6 '
NHTSA rules are refined periodically through its own testing and its
national networks. NHTSA tests and rates vehicle safety performance during
frontal, side, and rollover crashes as part of the Department of
Transportation's statutory duty to develop information on crash safety and
provide it to consumers.62 It also participates in the multidisciplinary Crash
Injury Research and Engineering Network ("CIREN") to identify areas for
improvement in the prevention and treatment of crash injuries.
63
56. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor
Vehicle Safely, 4 YALEJ. ON REGUL. 257, 264 (1987) ("[FMVSS] covers a wide number of specific
topics, such as requirements for instrument panels, seat backs, protrusions, sun visors, and arm
rests."); 49 C.F.R. Pt. 571 (2019).
57. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 581.1-.8.
58. See id. § 581.2; 49 U.S.C. § 32501 (2018).
59. See generally Bumper Q&A 's, NAT'I. HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://
icsw.nhtsa.gov/cars/Problems/studies/Bumper [https://perma.cc/K495-9LgR] (providing an
overview and history of the history of bumper standards in federal regulations).
6o. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 13, at 10-14 (arguing that NHTSA shifted from a
rule-making approach tackling auto safety directly to a recall-focused approach that does little to
improve safety).
61. CHARLESJ. KAHANE, LIvEs SAVED BY VEHICLE SAFETY TECHNOLOGIES AND ASSOCIATED
FEDERAL MOTOR VEIIICLE SAFETLY STANDARDS, 1960 To 2012 - PASSENGER CARS AND LTVs 4-6
(2015), https://www-esv.nhtsa.dot.gov/proceedings/24/files/24ESV-000291.PDF [https://
perma.cc/C4TX-Q5H81.
62. See 49 U.S.C. § 32302; Ratings, U.S. DEPT OF TRANSP.: NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/ratings [https://perma.cc/NJ4 7-6WAL] (describing the New
Car Assessment Program).
63. Crash Injury Research, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.: NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFELY ADMIN.,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/research-data/crash-injury-research [https://perma.cc/EJK2-QVJH];
Crash Injury Research and Engineering Network (CIREN), EMORY UNIV. SCH. OF MED., https://
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Virtually all of CIREN's research focuses on vehicles and the impact of
crashes on passengers. A pilot project is currently reviewing nine pedestrian
injury cases and is expected to recommend improvements to the way industry
and government categorizes pedestrian crashes, new documentation
techniques, and data collection tools.Ii4 The findings are expected to modestly
update NHTSA's last pedestrian-specific study, conducted from 1994 to 1998
and reviewing more than 500 pedestrian-involved crashes.I5 That study
analyzed pedestrian characteristics (height, age, activity at the time of the
crash), driver characteristics (age, driving record, whether they attempted to
avoid the crash), and vehicle characteristics.66 The tiny amount of pedestrian-
related analysis confirms NHTSA and CIREN near-neglect of non-driver
safety.
Research has already shown that taller cars cause more injuries 67 Yet the
federal government addresses height only in two indirect ways. First, it
regulates the height of headlights, which may have an incidental effect on the
overall vehicle height.68 Second, it requires passenger cars-but importantly,
not SUVs or trucks-to satisfy NHTSA bumper collision standards for impacts
between 16 and 20 inches in height.69 Because the federal government does
not regulate overall width and height, states are not preempted from doing
so, and many do.70 States can also ban vehicles of a certain size from operating
on particular roads, even if the vehicles are otherwise legal. In addition, states
can and do prohibit post-purchase modifications of the suspension of the
med.emory.edu/departments/emergency-medicine/ciren.html [https://perma.cc/322Z-CYKZ];
NAT'L HIGIIWAY TRAFFIc SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., CIREN PROGRAM REPORT, 2002,
at i-9 (2003), https://www.careforcrashvictims.com/assets/CIREN2.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QAR 7 -GBgF]; Crash Viewer, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIc SAFETY ADMIN., https://crashviewer.
nhtsa.dot.gov [https://perma.cc/RA4W-PUTP].
64. RODNEY R[TDD, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., CIREN PEDESTRIAN PILOT
STUDY PRELIMINARY CASES 2-3 (2020), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/
documents/ciren-pedestrian-pilot-study-preliminary-cases-tag.pdf [https://perma.cc/7 8AZ-
B2KF].
65. U.S. Gov'T AccOUNTABILTIY OFF., GAO-20-4 9, PEDESTRIAN SAFETY: NHTSA NEEDS TO
DECIDE WHETHER TO INCLUDE PEDESTRIAN SAFETY TESTS IN ITS NEW CAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
18-20 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/71 o/7o6348.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8BMYSHU].
66. AITGUSTUS "CHIP" B. CHIDESTER & RUTH A. ISENBERG, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., FINAL REPORT - THE PEDESTRIAN CRASH DATA STUDY 1-g (2001).
67. See New Car Assessment Program, 8o Fed. Reg. 78,522, 78,547 (proposed Dec. 16,
2015); see also Eric D. Lawrence, Nathan Bomey & Kristi Tanner, Death on Foot: America's Love of
SU/Vs is Killing Pedestrians, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Dec. 15, 2019, 11:24 PM), https://www.freep.com/
story/money/cars/2018/o6/28/suvs-killing-americas-pedestrians/646139002 [https://perma.cc
/XJH 3 -7 3Y2] (describing how the increase in SUVs has led to more fatalities); Devon 
E. Lefler &
Hampton C. Gabler, The Emerging Threat of Light Truck Impacts With Pedestrians I (Rowan Univ.,
Working Paper No. 212, 2001) (describing how the increase in LTVs could lead to a higher risk
of injury in accidents).
68. 49 C.F.R. § 571.108 (2019).
69. Id. § 581. 7 .
70. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-262 to -270 (2019).
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vehicle. Several states regulate bumper height: Bumpers that are too high hurt
pedestrians because of the car's higher center of gravity, while bumpers that
are too low endanger passenger safety in a collision with another vehicle.
Connecticut, for example, prohibits people from adding more than four
inches to the manufacturer height or lowering it so less than four inches exist
between the vehicle and the road surface.71 Meanwhile, Maryland has specific
height standards for bumpers, depending on the type of vehicle.72
After the car is sold, regulation of after-market parts or modifications is
generally left to states and municipalities. Changes include those made after
the car is purchased, such as additional window tinting, and modifications of
suspension or exhaust.73 For example, Connecticut regulates noise levels for
motor vehicle noise emissions,74 after-market tinted windows,75 suspensions,76
and headlights.77 One type of after-market part that could be, but is not,
regulated by states is the grille guard, commonly known as the "bull bar": a
stiff cage mounted on the front of the car and intended to protect the vehicle.
Bull bars have been banned in several countries because of the threats they
pose to cars without bull bars and to pedestrians.78 But in the United States,
they are a popular and legal aesthetic accessory. Even the police use them,
allegedly to protect patrol vehicles and allow for better positioning of sirens
and lights.79 One modest limitation on state regulation of bull bars exists:
NHTSA indicated in 1998 that states may not permit the installation of grill
guards that would interfere with FMVSS standards, such as those regarding
the use of headlights.8o
71. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 1 4 -1 3 7-2 5 (b) (1)-(2) (2015).
72. MD. CODE REGS. 11.14.02.07 (2021).
73. See Ki Akhbari, Dangerous Automobile Accessories, LEGALMATCH (May 7, 2018, 12:42 AM),
h ttps://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/dangerous-automobile-accessories.html
[https://perma.cc/HXC3-MPK9]; Rosemary Avance, Auto Accessories and the Law, CONSUMER
AFFAIRS (Sept. 28, 2020), https://www.consumeraffais.com/automotive/auto-accessory-laws.htm
[https://perma.cc/4 2EW-RCAX].
74. CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 14-80-1a to -8oa-loa (2021).
75. Id. §§ 14-99g-1 to -8.
76. Id. §§ 14-137-24 to -26.
77. Id. §§ 14-137-99 to -1o6.
78. Ediriweera Desapriya et al., Bull Bars and Vulnerable Road Users, 13 TRAFFIC INJ.
PREVENTION 86, 88-89 (2012); LOUISE BUTCHER, MOTOR VEHICLES: Bul.L BARS 2 (2009).
79. Angie Schmitt, Outlawed Abroad, Killer "Bull Bars" Are the Hot Fashion Accessory for Police
Departments, STREETSBLOG: USA (Aug. 2, 2018), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2018/08/02/
outlawed-abroad-killer-bull-bars-are-the-hot-fashion-accessory-for-police-departments [https://
perma.cc/6F5E-4BUH]; David Zipper, Ilow Cities Can Reclaim Their Streets from SUVs, BLOOMBERG:
CnIYLAB (Sept. 17, 2020, 6:oo AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-9-1 7/
how-cities-could-push-back-on-pickups-and-suvs [https://perma.cc/2S3 Z-NP8D].
8o. See Letter from NHTSA Chief Counsel Frank Seales, Jr., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.: NAT'L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFE'IY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/1874 ztv [https://
perma.cc/YQG9-7TC8]; see also Letter from NHTSA Acting Chief Counsel John Womack, U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP.: NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.nhtsa.gov/
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As the NHTSA regulation on bull bars exemplifies, there is a persistent
trend in regulators at all levels to prioritize passenger safety and consumer
expense. Unfortunately, this priority comes at the expense of pedestrians and
other nondrivers.
2. Emissions System Design
Regulators have weighed trade-offs between costs to consumers, public
health, and the environment in the area of emissions. The federal
government plays as dominant a role here as it does with body design. Yet
there is a robust debate (and several ongoing lawsuits involving nearly half
the states) about the role of states in emissions regulation.
The federal government has enacted various performance standards that
aim to cap vehicle emissions. Chief among these are fuel economy standards
established by the Environmental Protection Agency and NHTSA and
applicable to new cars.8, Fuel economy standards specify how many miles a
vehicle must travel per gallon; the higher the number of miles, the less gas is
used, and the fewer emissions created. In 2020, the Trump administration
adopted the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient ("SAFE") standard, which
significantly slowed adoption of more stringent fuel economy standards.82
Federal regulators claimed that less stringent standards would ensure lower
prices for new cars, thus enticing more consumers to abandon less safe and
less efficient cars. However, it seems likely that federal regulators
overestimated the consumer benefits of SAFE.s
The federal government also regulates emissions of existing vehicles.
Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency sets standards
interpretations/brookvilrbm [https://perma.cc/BCX6-LGNX] ("States have the authority to
regulate modifications that individual vehicle owners may make to their own vehicles.").
8i. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (2018); Regulations for Onroad Vehicles and Engines, U.S. ENv'T
PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulations-
onroad-vehicles-and-engines [https://perma.cc/GT6Z-PGEV] (last updated Dec. 18, 2020);
Corporate Average Iuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. (Aug. I I, 2014), https://
www.transportation.gov/mission/sustainability/corporate-average-fue-economy-cafe-standards
[https://perma.cc/Z8TR-XTBX].
82. SALE, U.S. DEP'T OFTRANSP.: NAT'L HIGiWAYTRAFFIC SAFE'IYADMIN. (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/corporate-average-fuel-economy/safe [https://perma.cc/WA6R-R6VQ];
see Regulations for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Passenger Cars and Trucks, U.S. ENv'T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/regulations-greenhouse-gas-
emissions-passenger-cars-and (https://perma.cc/6LKT-BT5 T] (last updated Aug. 12, 2020).
The prior standard increased fuel economy standards by five percent each model year, while the
SAFE standard increases standards by just one and one-half percent. See 49 U.S.C. § 32902;
Regulations for Onroad Vehicles and Engines, supra note 8 i; Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAJE)
Standards, supra note 81.
83. See Romany Webb, Five Important Points About the EPA's "SAFE Vehicle Rule", EARTH INST.:




for the allowable levels of air pollutants, including greenhouse gases.84 States
are responsible for implementing the federal program, but Congress has
expressly allowed NHTSA to grant California a waiver to adopt and enforce
more stringent emissions standards.85 Waivers must be granted unless: (1) the
state "was arbitrary and capricious in its finding that its standards are, in the
aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable
federal standards;" (2) the state "does not need such standards to meet
compelling and extraordinary conditions; or" (3) "such standards and
accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with ... the Clean
Air Act."86
Pursuant to these rules, California obtained its first waiver in 1968.87 The
waiver enabled the state to adopt an advanced clean car regulation, including
a zero-emission vehicles program, and establish greenhouse gas emissions
caps.88 More than 20 states incorporated California's standards into their own
laws. In 2019, however, the Trump Administration revoked California's waiver
with the intent to obliterate the regulatory scheme in every state using it, on
two primary grounds.'9 The Administration stated that the California
standards are not required "to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions" specific to California.90 The NHTSA also claimed California's
greenhouse gas emissions mandate functioned as fuel economy regulation
and thus was preempted by the SAFE vehicles rule.9' Several lawsuits by 23
84. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(i); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 6(a),
15(c)(2), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690, 1713; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (holding
that greenhouse gas emissions are in the Clean Air Act's regulatory scope).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 7543; Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 9o-148, § 2o8, 8i Stat. 485, 501.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 7543; Vehicle Emissions California Waivers and Autlwrizations, U.S. ENV'T PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/state-and-local-transportation/vehicle-emissions-california-waivers-
and-authorizations [https://perma.cc/8EC-X35 3] (last updated Feb. 20, 2020).
87. California State Standards; Waiver of Application of Section 208, Clean Air Act, 33 Fed.
Reg. 1o,16o, io,16o (July i6, ig68).
88. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, H 1961.3, 1962.2 (202 1); Emily Wimberger & Hannah Pitt,
Come and Take It: Revoking the California Waiver, RHODIUM GRP. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://
rhg.com/research/come-and-take-it-revoking-the-california-waiver [https://perma.cc/YL66-ZBNY];
Thomas M. Donnelly & Nicholas M. Faas, Challenges to Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient Vehicles Rule
Keep Coming, JONES DAY: INSIGHTS (July 2020), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights
/2020/07/challenges-to-safer-affordable-fuelefficient-vehicles-rule-keepcoming [https://perma.cc/
7WFN-VNVF].
89. California & the Waiver: The Facts, CAL. AIR REs. BD. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://
ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/fact-sheets/california-waiver-facts [https://perma.cc/ZAZ5-VSEV].
go. The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National
Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51,310, 51,339 (Sept. 27, 2019) (codified at 4o C.F.R. pts. 85 & 86 and
49 C.F.R. pts. 531 & 533).
91. See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021
-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174, 24,182 (Apr. 30, 2020) (codified
at 4 o C.F.R. pts. 86 & 6oo and 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536 & 537)
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states and other parties seeking to restore the waiver are pending in federal
court.92
States' adoption of more stringent emissions requirements has significant
benefits. Because vehicles can freely travel across state lines and frequently
move around the country, car manufacturers have generally decided to
comply with California's rules, even when selling cars in states not subject to
them. State laws have therefore influenced vehicle production in a positive
way-one of the supposed benefits of federalism.
This overview of both body and emissions system design standards
reinforces concerns about the street design standards. National vehicle
standards prioritizing the car industry and drivers and their pocketbooks take
precedence over the safety of non-drivers and the costs of inadequate vehicle
design to society as a whole. Inertia prevails even in the face of effective vehicle
design improvements in Europe and elsewhere.93 And, as in the case with
street design standards, vehicle design standards are almost exclusively
adopted at the national level-and efforts are underway to stop states from
innovating to adopt standards to improve air quality and public health.
IV. EVALUATING FEDERALISM IN THE DESIGN STANDARDS
Talking about federalism in the abstract often yields broad
overgeneralizations about its characteristics and its merits.94 Despite the
diverse ways federalism can be described, particular regulatory schemes must
be evaluated on their own terms. That is why this Essay takes up Heather
Gerken's call to examine "which flavor of federalism best fits a given
context."95 As Part III revealed, federalism is hanging on by a thread in the
92. See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, California v. Chao, No.
1:19-cv02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019) (providing some examples of pending cases and court
filings seeking to restore the waiver); Petition for Review, Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., No. 19-1230 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 28, 2019) (same); Petition for
Review, California v. Wheeler, No. 20-1357 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 2020) (same). For additional
information, see also California v. Chao, CLIMATE CASE CHART, http://climatecasechart.com/
case/california-v-chao [https://perma.cc/Y3FQH65 W] (providing additional information on
the above-cited cases); Union of Concerned Scientists v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
CLIMATE CASE CHART, http://climatecasechart.com/case/union-of-concerned-scientists-v-national-
highway-traffic-safety-administration [https://pema.cc/ATF3-HTDW] (same).
93. See supra Section III.B.2.
94. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1485 (1994)
(explaining that scholars disagree on whether federalism generally "improves government or
impedes progress, enhances freedom or permits racism, fosters participatory democracy or
entrenches local elites, facilitates regulatory diversity or creates races to the bottom, protects
individual liberty or encourages tyranny, promotes responsible fiscal policy or generates
inexorable pressures to expand government").
95. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 5 3 WM. &MARY L. REv. 1549, 1552 (2012).
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street-design context, and it is increasingly discordant in the vehicle-design
context. In both instances, an unhealthy legal culture has led to dysfunction
that undermines three key values that federalism promises: representation,
innovation, and liberty. This Part takes a deeper look at how these values are
threatened by the particular legal cultures surrounding both regulatory
schemes.
A. PFPRFSFNTATION
One of the potential advantages of federalism is that it enables
participatory democracy.96 People can influence the policymaking process at
multiple levels, the theory goes, and this access not only has intrinsic value,
but may result in better outcomes.
For all of this to be true, however, participatory mechanisms must be
sound, in the Pitkin tradition. At a minimum, there must be a mechanism by
which a diverse group of constituents can provide actionable comment to
decision-makers in the rule-making process. Unfortunately, there is no such
mechanism for the adoption of either street or vehicle design standards. On
paper, the public is invited to participate: Federal, State, and local
governments generally hold hearings or accept written testimony during the
process of adopting laws and regulations. Administrative law requires
decision-makers to at least consider such comments. In reality, however,
public comment in the street and vehicle design context feels like a sham
-primarily because of the role of nongovernmental, professional membership
associations.97
The influence of such associations is particularly pronounced in the
adoption of street standards. As noted above, three associations-AASHTO,
the ICC, and the NCUTCD-dictate, in different ways, the layout and
operation of most paved streets in the country.98 At the federal level, the
AASHTO Green Book and the NCUTCD's MUTCD are formally adopted by
statute and by regulation for most federal roads. In addition, state and local
laws enshrine both standards, as well as fire codes, which regulate width, one
of the most important geometric factors of street design. These manuals and
codes originate not in public processes but in years-long, closed discussions
among members. When an update is complete, it is identified by year or
version number, and it stands as a unified whole.
Governments will periodically adopt newer versions of these third-party
street standards. But because of the structure of the adoption process by the
organizations that create them, the content of any newer versions is a fait
accompli. An ordinary person expressing concerns about, say, the impact of
specific intersection design requirements in the Green Book on disabled
96. See supra Section I.B. i.
97. See supra Part III.
98. See supra Section II.A.
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pedestrians, has no practical mechanism requiring AASHTO to revise the
Green Book to improve the specific design requirement, nor is it likely that a
governmental agency will accept a proposal as a stand-alone amendment.
In failing to incorporate public comment, the adoption process also fails
to facilitate a range of views that can improve outcomes. The associations from
which the street standards derive generally lack racial-ethnic, socioeconomic,
and professional diversity.1m Their leadership and membership reflect the
demographics of professions that are predominantly white and male.
Moreover, members tend to share a worldview: They are mostly technical
experts who prioritize, and are trained to achieve, the smooth operation of
vehicular traffic.-o Presumably most lack training in urban planning or spatial
psychology, or a grounding in transportation inequality.
In addition, two of the three street design guidelines are only accessible
to the general public for a fee.o Thus, people cannot understand the laws
unless they can afford to pay. This may change, with current litigation about
whether private-association codes that are adopted as law may be
copyrighted.'o2 The Supreme Court recently said "copyright does not vest
in works that are (1) created by judges and legislators (2) in the course of
their judicial and legislative duties.",o3 Applying this government edicts
doctrine to street standards would help safeguard the public's interest in
being able to read the laws that bind them.
Thankfully, private association influence is not nearly as problematic in
the vehicle standards. Most vehicle standards are developed by federal
government professionals and their consultants through a fairly technical
rule-making process. Still, most ordinary people cannot influence specific
vehicle standards, because they will not have access to crash test data or
99. See Civil Engineers, DATA USA, https://datausa.io/profile/soc/civil-engineers
[https://perma.cc/AC6Y-VSWA] (listing an 83.4 percent male and 7' .3 percent white workforce
for civil engineers); Industrial Engineers, Including Health & Safety, DATA USA, https://datausa.io/
profile/soc/industrial-engineers-including-health-safety#demographics [https://perma.cc/4 W5 F-
PE2X] (listing a 79.8 percent male and 70 percent white workforce for industrial engineers).
1 oo. See generally TOM VANDERBILT, TRAFFIC: WHY WE DRIVE THE WAY WE Do (AND WHAT IT
SAYS ABOUT Us) (2009) (discussing how traffic is created by, among other things, experts'
misunderstanding of human behavior and preferences).
101. Publication Detail: A Policy on Geonetric Design of'Highways and Streets, 7 th Edition, AM. Ass' N
OF STATE HIGHWAY & TRANSP. OFFS.: STORE, https://store.transportation.org/item/
collectiondetail/ i 8o [https://perma.cc/SM5 C-BESB] (selling the book to the general public for
$388 for hard copy and $310 for digital download); 2021 International Fire Code, INT'L CODE
COUNCIL, https://shop.iccsafe.org/codes/2021-international-fire-coder.html [https:/penma.cc/
BQA2-g26P] (selling the code to the general public for $8.60 per month for a digital rental and
$127 for a softcover). The MUTCD, published by a government agency, is available without
charge.
102. See generallyInt'l Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes, Inc., No. 17 Civ. 6261 (VM), 2020 WL
2750636 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020) (discussing the ICC's copyright infringement claim against a
company that has posted the ICC's codes on their website).
1 03. Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1508 (2020).
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scientific studies needed to rebut government findings, and they will not have
the technical knowledge needed to speak the language of regulators. Of
course, this is a significant problem with the administrative state in general.
B. INNOVATION
A second potential advantage of federalism is that it enables innovation
by different levels of government. Smaller units of governments, it is said, can
experiment with different methods of regulation and craft unique and
interesting solutions to regulatory problems.
Unfortunately, positive experimentation regulating street and vehicle
design is not a practical reality. Mashaw and Harfst observe that "continuous
and surprisingly sharp pressures on regulatory structures and regulatory
behavior[s]" hinder adaptation.04 Even if most subnational governments will
be too burdened by inertia, high start-up costs, and network externalities,
among other things, to aspire to create their own design standards, those that
do are wary of deviating too far from national standards. In vehicle design,
federal actors have invoked preemption to hinder the ability of other
governments to advance their own regulatory frameworks improving on
federal standards. Similarly, the application of sovereign immunity doctrine
constrains innovation in street design because it leads decision-makers to
believe that innovation will be punished. This Section addresses the question
of why, if states and local governments technically may and actively do wish to
deviate from national standards, they do not.
1. Preemption
Preemption generally occurs when a higher governmental authority
legislates in a particular subject area, and either expressly confirms its intent
to preempt lower government authorities, or impliedly preempts by requiring
conduct in conflict with what a lower authority requires, or by occupying the
field in a pervasive way. Federal preemption often occurs where national rules
help avoid interstate conflicts or harms or can promote values, such as
national security and defense policy, essential to shared national interests.
Courts vary on how Congress might demonstrate its intent to occupy the field.
Express statutory language is certainly clearest, but other indications of intent
include the regulatory system's pervasiveness and complexity, and the
dominance of the federal interests involved.
Even with this highly simplified context, clearly Congress should, as it
does, occupy the regulatory field when it comes to interstate highways and
federal roads. This infrastructure serves national interests and federal funds
build it. Allowing states to establish their own guidelines for federal
infrastructure would create chaos in procurement, construction, and
maintenance. While clearly asserting their authority in highways and federal
104. MASHAw & HARFST, supra note 13, at g.
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roads, federal actors have not attempted to directly regulate the design of state
and local roads. Such roads are more likely to serve subnational interests and
be funded primarily with nonfederal funds.
When it comes to vehicle design standards, the balance of power has not
been so clearly established. Strong arguments exist for Congressional
occupation of most of that regulatory field. Vehicles can easily travel across
state lines, and having 50 different rules for their design would present car
manufacturers with an impossible burden, not to mention posing safety
hazards to drivers. For these reasons, federal agencies establish standards
constraining vehicle design and setting baseline thresholds for emissions
systems.
Yet Congress has chosen not to regulate all aspects of vehicle design. As
noted in Part III, Congress does not regulate most after-market additions to a
vehicle's body, and it has expressly indicated an intent to allow California to
obtain a waiver to adopt and enforce emissions standards that are stricter than
federal standards.-os The Trump Administration's 2019 revocation of
California's longstanding waiver is currently being litigated. The revocation
illustrates the perils for states of acting even when Congress has expressed an
intent to allow them to do so.
The frequently shifting political and doctrinal mess of preemption law is
well-known. o6 Legal scholars increasingly support the establishment of an
anti-preemption presumption: that is, a presumption that the states can act.
Calling for greater scrutiny of agency actions, Tom Merrill suggests that courts
should not defer to agencies' interpretations about the preemptive effect of
statutes or their own regulations.07 Roderick Hills, meanwhile, has argued for
an anti-preemption rule for statutory construction, on the theory that states
are better situated to enact laws affecting business interests, and business
groups are better positioned than non-business groups to mobilize
congressional preemption of state rules.108 In this view, states can help set the
agendas for national government by lawmaking. And in a paper focusing
105. See supra Part III; supra note 85 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Strange Bedfellows: The Politics of Preemption, 59 CASE W. RSRv.
L. REv. 837, 839 (2009) (focusing "on the politics of preemption, [and] exploring the political
and policy bases undergirding the doctrine");Jesse Merriam, Preemption as a Consistency Doctrine,
25 WM. & MARY BIL.L Ris. J. 981, 983 (2017) (discussing "the mass and welter that we know as
preemption law" and "the 'chaos' pervading the doctrine"); Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of
Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000) (stating that "the Supreme Court's numerous
preemption cases follow no predictable jurisprudential or analytical pattern"); Mary J. Davis,
Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 968 (2002) (calling
preemption doctrine "exceedingly puzzling"); Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-Emption Presumption
that Never Was: Pre-Emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1379, 1381 (1998)
(discussing "the Supreme Court's lenient [preemption] doctrine and its lack of clarity").
107. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 727, 729
-30 (2008).
08. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2007).
2021 ] 2177
IOWA LAW REVIEW
primarily on environmental law, Erin Ryan goes one step further by arguing
for a "judicial presumption against preemption" to safeguard state and local
autonomy.-0 9 If the court adopts any of these views in the California waiver
litigation, it will be more likely to favor the states' interests, even before
reaching the merits of the underlying statutory construction claims, including
what constitutes compelling and extraordinary conditions requiring a waiver.
Judicial decisions and agency interpretations matter because they can
discourage states from innovating in the direction of beneficial outcomes.
The California standards, for example, significantly reduce greenhouse gas
emissions in cars subject to them. But, more importantly, even though not all
states have opted in to the California requirements, manufacturers have an
incentive to voluntarily ensure that all their new vehicles meet a more
stringent standard instead of producing two separate fleets." The fact that
California has been allowed to regulate at all has forced significant, likely life-
saving changes across the car manufacturing industry. This impact should be
encouraged. Instead, current agency and judicial interpretations of
preemption deter state innovation and undermine the promise of federalism.
2. Immunity
Meanwhile, a significant legal barrier to innovation in street design is the
lack of clarity regarding local government immunity. The federal and state
governments typically enjoy absolute immunity from suit, except where they
have expressly legislated to subject themselves to suit. A handful of states have
expressly established local immunity for street design." Outside of those
states, the status of local government immunity remains unclear. Local
governments' immunity often depends on balancing a variety of factors,
including whether a state law renders them immune in conducting certain
activities; whether their activities are governmental (relating to their origins
as a subdivision of the state) or proprietary functions, for which they will not
be immune; and whether their activities are based in policy or merely
responsive to a particular condition.
Local immunity matters because local governments (including counties,
municipal, and other non-state, non-federal jurisdictions) are responsible for
77 percent of roads in this country."2 With very few exceptions, these roads
are designed to satisfy the standards of the AASHTO Green Book, fire codes,
10g. Erin Ryan, The Twin Ennvironmental Law Problems of Preemption and Political Scale, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, DISRUPTED (Keith Hirokawa & Jessica Owley, eds., forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 3).
110. See Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards / Greenhouse Gas Standards, ENv'T & ENERGY
L. PROGRAM (Sept. 27, 2017), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/og/corporate-average-fuel-
economy-standards-greenhouse-gas-standards [https://perma.cc/3SM-CDHZ].
S1 1. See, e.g., N.M. STAr. ANN. § 41-4-1 1(B) (1) (West 2020); S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-78-60(15)
(2005 ); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-12o(a)(i) (2019).
112. Highway Statistics 2017, supra note 40.
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and the MUTCD. But these standards, unfortunately, prioritize cars at the
expense of non-driver safety, and erode quality of place. Simultaneously, local
leaders are increasingly recognizing that wide streets that encourage driving
have serious collateral consequences, including increasing pedestrian and
bicyclist fatalities and causing climate-change. Given these issues, local leaders
are eager to implement safer "slow streets," multi-modal configurations, and
narrow lanes."3 But before they depart from the more common, national
standards, they must understand whether and how these decisions are
protected.
Local governments are responsible for the maintenance and construction
of streets."4 However, in a majority of states, they may not be liable for
negligence related to street design, if a design decision is made subject to a
broad policy or if the design was selected or created by professionals
reasonably exercising their responsibilities as government employees.'5
Regarding broad policy, one scholar has convincingly argued that local
governments prioritizing pedestrian safety over vehicle speed cannot be held
liable for consequences of the corresponding street design, such as narrowed
travel lanes." 6
Regarding government professionals, courts have typically granted
immunity to local governments whose employees used AASHTO and the
other traditional national standards, such as the MUTCD and the fire code,
to design streets."7 In practice, these traditional standards provide a safe
harbor; because following them allows a locality to establish a regulatory
compliance defense in tort claims."8 For that reason, few jurisdictions have
i 13. From Boston to San Francisco, cities across the United States have been implementing
"slow streets," particularly in 2020, amid the COVID-ig pandemic. See Joseph Glandorf, Slow
Streets Movement Looks to Reimagine Urban Spaces Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, ENv'T & ENERGY STUDY
INST. (Sept. 15. 2020), https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/slow-streets-movement-looks-to-
reimagine-urban-spaces-amid-coronavirus-pandemic [https://perma.cc/27 H 9-CZ6M]; Streetsfor
Pandemic Response and Recovery: Slow Streets, NAT'L Ass'N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFS., https://
nacto.org/publication/streets-for-pandemic-response-recovery/emerging-street-strategies/slowstreets
[https://perma.cc/EgMS-XZLL].
[14. See Weightman v. Corp. of Wash., 66 U.S. (1 Black) 39, 52 (1861) ("[Municipalities
must] keep their highways safe and convenient for travelers by day and by night.").
115. See Don F. Vaccaro, Annotation, Liability of Governmental Entity or Public Offlicerfor Personal
Injury or Damages Arising out of Vehicular Accident Due to Negligent or Defective Design of a Highway, 45
A.L.R.3 d 875, § 7 (1972).
16. Michael Lewyn, Why Pedestrian-Friendly Street Design. Is Not Negligent, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L.
REv. 339, 360-62 (2008).
117. Id. at 339-40; see also Debra L. Stephens & Bryan P. Harnetiaux, The Value of Government
Tort Liability: Washington State's Journey from Immunity to Accountability, 30 SEATFr1LE U. L. REV. 35, 51
n.95 (2006) (noting that "negligence [can] be established by reference to the [MUTCD]
standards"); North Dakota Supreme Court Review, 61 N.D. L. REV. 55, 78 (1985) (discussing a
negligence action which relied on the MUTCD to identify duty to erect proper construction site
signage).
18. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, H. Lee Barfield II, David A. King, Joshua R. Denton &
Stephen J. Jasper, Providing a Safe IIarbor for Those Who Play by the Rules: The Case for a Strong
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tested alternatives to AASHTO; just a few dozen municipalities, for example,
have adopted the National Association of City Transportation Officials' design
guidelines, which incorporate the needs of non-drivers to a greater extent
than the AASTHO standards."9 It is unclear whether local governments
adopting alternatives to AASHTO standards will be granted immunity,
because cases challenging alternative designs have not been through the
courts.
But blind adherence to AASHTO standards will not necessarily absolve a
municipality from liability. For instance, the New York Court of Appeals
imposed liability on New York City for its failure to provide traffic calming
measures.'2 0 At issue in that case was the death of a Brooklyn boy killed by a
driver operating a vehicle at 54 miles-per-hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone.
The outcome is unique in protecting non-drivers: No other state supreme
court has ruled the same under analogous facts. Even New York continues to
recognize that where there is "a deliberate and reasonable planning decision
made to ensure the safety of pedestrians," government will be immune."'
C. LIBERTY
Finally, federalism can protect individual liberty,2-a concept that
receives less scholarly attention than representation and innovation. The
representation frame focuses on the adoption process, and the innovation
frame focuses on the nature of the laws, while the liberty frame focuses
exclusively on substantive outcomes. The primary evaluative questions here
are whether federalist systems enhance freedom by protecting people from
known or knowable harms, or by institutionalizing an appropriate amount of
choice and agency.
Reviewing the liberty impact of the street and vehicle design standards
requires a rights-based, outcomes-focused lens. It also requires weighing the
rights of some people against the rights of others. Statistics show that the
rights of drivers and car owners are maximally protected in the current
scheme of vehicle design regulation. This protection, however, comes at the
expense of all other roadway users. In the current system, drivers do not pay
for, nor are they necessarily aware of, the costs they impose on others. In a
Coasian world, the cheapest cost avoider is the driver, but design standards
Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 115, 123-24; Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of
Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 175, 191-92 (1989).
i 19. See About NACTO, NAT'L ASS'N OF CITY TRANSP. OFFS., www.nacto.org/about [https://
perma.cc/7W8Z-SXLG].
120. Turturro v. City of New York, 68 N.E.3d 693, 707-08 (N.Y. 2016) (upholding jury
verdict). New York considers the duty to keep streets safe to be a proprietary function, thus
allowing liability to be imposed on municipalities for failure to do so. See id. at 701.
121. Enker v. County of Sullivan, 162 A.D. 3d 1366, 1368 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
122. See supra Section II.B. 3 .
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fail to impose costs on drivers that account for the negative externalities they
create.2 3
For example, regulations that require manufacturers to add pedestrian
safety features or reduce emissions could increase the cost of cars. Such
features include advanced driver assistance systems, blind spot warnings,
automatic emergency braking systems, and ignition technology. These costs
would be borne by the car's purchaser, the person most likely to be the driver.
Similarly, changes in street design that are intended to protect non-drivers-say,
bulb-outs and narrower lanes-may also slow traffic. Again, the burden of lost
time, however modest, would fall on the driver. To explain why these design
features are not generally required, we may look to the role of the consumer.
The rational, car-buying consumer may want a car that protects them, and
roads that enable efficient trips. These goals align with industry goals of
making driving appealing, safe (for drivers), and fast. There is therefore a
built-in conflict between car-driving consumers, who may want less regulation,
and non-car-driving people, who may want more.
Assessing vehicle design through this lens highlights another failure.
Regulations focused on externalities created by drivers-and imposed on
non-drivers-would advance liberty, but they have not been championed by
either federal or state governments. Not only has the federal government
implemented laws that favor drivers, but states are nearly nonexistent in that
regulatory sphere-to the point where some might argue that federalism, if it
exists at all here, has a "roll-over-and-play-dead" quality. Without state activity,
people cannot escape by "voting with their feet."
It is important to understand why the right kinds of rules matter: they
might mean life (the ultimate liberty) or death. In the United States,
pedestrian fatalities "increased from about 4,400 in 2oo8 to ... 6,300 in
2018." 24 There are many variables involved, but vehicle type plays a role: The
number of pedestrian crashes increased among vehicles 11 years old or older,
and among SUVs.'25 Pedestrian fatalities may increase further, as in just a few
years SUVs may account for four in every five car sales. 26
By contrast, in the European Union ("EU"), pedestrian fatalities
decreased over a similar period. In 2016, 5,320 pedestrians were killed in the
EU, which represents a 36 percent decrease compared with the 8,342 killed
123. See generally Ian W. H. Parry, Margaret Walls & Winston Harrington, Automobile
Externalities and Policies, 45J. EcoN. LITERATURE 373 (2007) (cataloguing vehicle externalities not
accounted for by imposing costs on the driver).
1 24. U.S. Gov'T AccOUNTABILnY OFF., supra note 65, at I.
125. Id. at 13.
1 26. Jack Walsworth, Car Sales on Pace to lit 6o-Year Low, AUTo. NEWS (July 2, 2018, 1:o AM),
https://www.autonews.com/article/2o 18o702/RETAILo / 1807o9977/car-sales-on-pace-to-hit-
6o-year-low [https://perma.cc/N8LT-6LFL] (mentioning trucks, SUVs, and crossovers "could
account for 75 to 8o percent of. .. sales by 2025").
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in 2007.127 This decrease could be due to a variety of factors, including
stronger regulation of vehicles and a deliberate approach to inclusive street
design. The European Commission has created a framework for regulating
vehicles to protect non-drivers' well-being. It has also studied active crash
prevention systems, such as sensors.128 Pedestrian and cyclist concerns are
mentioned far more frequently in European Commission guidance than in
U.S. guidance.129 And while both the EU and the United States signed a treaty
concerning global technical regulations, the United States has not worked to
realize its obligations.130 In particular, Global Technical Regulation No. 9,
which was created as part of the treaty, aims to improve pedestrian and
bicyclist safety by requiring vehicle hoods and bumpers that "absorb energy
more efficiently" during a collision.31 As noted above, American bumper
standards focus on mitigating damage to the vehicle itself. Some automakers
claim that the American bumper standards actually make it difficult to create
softer bumpers, as compared with Europe where there is no analogous
bumper standard.32 Global Technical Regulation No. 9 also includes a
standard for pedestrian crash mitigation tests, though none have been
implemented in the United States.133 The EU, meanwhile, has already begun
incorporating pedestrian crash avoidance system tests.3 4
The brief comparison illustrates the deficiencies of the United States'
regulatory approach and demonstrates that a balance between the liberties of
127. EUR. ROAD SAFETY OBSERvATORY, EUR. COMM'N, TRAFFIC SAFETY BASIC FACTS 2018:
PEDESTRIANS 2-3 (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/sites/roadsafety/files/
pdf/statistics/dacota/bfsoxxpedestrians.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5 F6-X92S]. The EU figures
here exclude Lithuania and Slovakia. Id. at 2.
128. See Prevent: Preventive and Active Safety Application, EUR. COMM'N: TRANSP. RSCII. &
INNOVATION MONITORING & INFO. SYS., https://trimis.ec.europa.eu/project/preventive-and-
active-safety-application#tab-results [https://perma.cc/QP6X-74 EZ]; APROSYS: Advanced
Protection Systems, EUR. COMM'N: TRANSP. RSCII. & INNOVATION MONITORING & INFO. SYS.,
https://trimis.ec.europa.eu/project/advanced-protection-systems [https://perma.cc/E788-UFSB].
129. See EUR. ROAD SAFETY OBSERVATORY, EuR. COMM'N, VEHICLE SAFETY 5-6 (2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/roadsafety/sites/roadsafety/files/pdf/ersosynthesis2o 18
-vehiclesafety.pdf [https://perma.cc/5 RKV-5B7R]; Pedestrians, EUR. COMM'N: MOBILL1Y
& TRANSP., https://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/users/pedestriansen [https://perma.
cc/GNJ4-VPJX].
130. Agreement Concerning the Establishing of Global Technical Regulations for Wheeled
Vehicles, Equipment and Parts Which Can Be Fitted and/or Be used on Wheeled Vehicles
addendum 9, Nov. 12, 2008, U.N. Doc. ECE/TRANS/ 1 8o/Add.9 ; see Pedestrian Safety: NIJTSA
Needs to Decide Whether to Include Pedestrian Safety Tests in Its New Car Assessment Program, U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-20-419 [https://
perma.cc/UY9A-A33N].
131. Id.
132. U.S. GoV'TACCOUNTABILITYOFF., supra note 65, at 3, 8-9, 27 (describing how eight of
the 13 auto makers interviewed felt that U.S. bumper standards presented a challenge to making
more pedestrian friendly bumpers, and these 13 auto makers accounted for 70 percent of new
vehicle sales in the U.S. in 2018).
133 See id. at 9-10.
134 Id. at 1o.
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drivers and non-drivers is possible. Standards that promote better-designed
streets and cars can protect marginalized and low-income populations that do
not have access to cars. For federalism to be successful in terms of outcome,
it must promote freedom for everyone, not just drivers.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Design standards of any kind have received scant attention from the legal
academy. Street and vehicle design standards deserve more scrutiny, however,
because they affect everyday life in ways that most other laws do not. As this
Essay has shown, the current standards imperil our safety in avoidable ways.
Before we can understand how to improve them, we must understand the role
of federalism, and how to better harness its promise of balancing state and
local interests with federal government power and of requiring accountability
from government to the broad spectrum of road users. 35
In light of the problems this Essay has identified, the overriding principle
in any response must be that non-drivers' interests should be better
represented throughout the process of creating, implementing, and adapting
street and vehicle design standards. These interests can be advanced in a
variety of ways.
New standards must address the problems of industry capture and non-
driver participation. Public input does not necessarily yield perfect, or
necessarily better, outcomes.136 However, the extent to which the public has
been blocked from meaningful participation in the design standards,
particularly those governing streets, is troubling. The current system
centralizes the power to draft standards in the hands of several unaccountable
trade organizations, with significant barriers to participation by the general
public. If government continues to rely on such organizations for rule-making
expertise, it must either require them to include non-drivers' perspectives at
the drafting level or create a more robust public vetting process on association
proposals. These proposals should not be presumed to be unchangeable or
adopted unmodified, as is the case now.
While the current system stifles adequate representation, it also stifles
innovation. Indeed, creativity is constrained by outdated legal principles that
lock in national design standards with detrimental effects. Current agency and
judicial interpretations of preemption deter innovation and undermine the
135. There are plenty of other problematic aspects not covered here-among them a lack of
resources and coordination. See, e.g., JOHN URGO, MEREDITH WILENSKY & STEVEN WEISSMAN,
MOVING BEYOND PREVAILING STREET DESIGN STANDARDS: ASSESSING LEGAL AND LIABILITY
BARRIERS TO MORE EFFICIENT STREET DESIGN AND FUNCI0N 4 (20io), https://www.law.
berkeley.edu/files/4. I_CREC_codesand_standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQE2-L5 SX].
136. See generally Mashaw & Harfst, sufpra note 56 (arguing that American legal culture




promise of federalism. Policymakers and judges must rethink the preemption
and sovereign immunity doctrines to avoid these negative consequences.
When it comes to street design, two approaches would be beneficial. First,
more states could adopt immunity statutes protecting local governments
acting in good faith to advance policies focused on the whole street, which
would help improve local-government confidence in healthy experimentation.
Local governments must be able to design better streets, but also to close them
or otherwise activate them for people. Second, more courts could allow a
regulatory compliance defense for adhering to a broader set of evidence-
based standards, beyond merely the Green Book and similar standards.
Reforming these doctrines will result in more creative solutions that de-
emphasize automobile speed and convenience. When it comes to vehicle
design, overhauling outdated federal agency culture and reversing the Trump
administration waiver recall are imperative. There are hopeful signs in a new
Transportation Secretary as this Essay goes to press.
Protecting liberty-including first and foremost freedom from bodily
harm by government-includes viewing design standards through a rights-
based lens that requires policymakers to enable, instead of thwart, beneficial
outcomes. It seems unlikely that a national Ralph Nader-esque figure will
emerge to fight for non-drivers who may not even participate in the industry
being regulated. But the persistent "it will never happen to me" perception
that drivers are immune from road violence must evolve. After all, each of us
is a non-driver, even if we also drive.
We have chosen the wrong balance of power among federal, state, and
local authorities, and we are paying the price. Our streets have become
increasingly dangerous places, occupied by increasingly dangerous vehicles.
The consequences of bad design can be measured in injury and even death.
This Essay argues that this outcome results from a largely ignored failure in
federalism. Reforming legal culture that has ossified street and vehicle design
will help achieve three key value propositions offered by federalism:
representation, innovation, and liberty. Preserving these three federalism
values will both vindicate the dead and protect the living.
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